66 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
# Holistic Rubric: Multi-Tenant Authorization in Background Workers
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### Task Summary
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The goal is to audit and refactor background SQS worker handlers (`voice-synthsizer-job-handler` and `voice-cloning-job-handler`) and database service wrappers in `potion-voice` to enforce strict multi-tenant data isolation by scoping all MongoDB queries with `userId`. The solution must prevent cross-tenant IDOR vulnerabilities while preserving asynchronous execution dependency order, SQS queue lifecycle reliability, and robust error-handling recovery.
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---
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### Ground Truth
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1. **Queue Message Context**: SQS messages for voice synthesis contain `job.salutationId`, `job.userAudioProfileId`, and `job.userId`, but do **not** convey `job.recordingId`.
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2. **Database Relationships**:
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- `RecordingSalutation` records link a `salutationId` to a parent `recordingId`.
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- `recordingId` must be extracted from `salutationToUpdate.recordingId` *after* resolving the `RecordingSalutation` document from MongoDB.
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3. **Mongoose Query Standards**:
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- Primary and secondary model operations (`UserAudioProfile`, `VoiceCloning`, `Salutation`, `Job`, `Recording`) must be scoped with `{ _id, userId, deleted: false }`.
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- Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate` accepts 3 arguments: `findOneAndUpdate(conditions, update, options)`. Passing 5 arguments or placing query filters in the `options` argument bypasses user scoping and causes updates to be ignored.
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4. **Queue & Async Lifecycle**:
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- SQS messages must remain in flight until speech synthesis, model artifact rendering, and S3 uploads complete successfully.
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- Deleting messages via `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS` before task completion prevents SQS redelivery on failure, causing unrecoverable data loss.
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5. **Error Status Updates**:
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- On error or authorization rejection, the worker must update MongoDB job/profile statuses to `'error'` regardless of pre-authorization state flags.
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---
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### Key AI Failure Modes (Meaningful Failures)
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* **Failure Mode 1: Missing Utility Module Startup Crash (`MODULE_NOT_FOUND`)**
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The agent adds import statements like `const { requireUserId, tenantFilter } = require('../worker_tenant')` across worker files without creating `worker_tenant.js` or `worker_tenant/index.js` in the repository. At runtime, Node.js throws `Error: Cannot find module '../worker_tenant'`, causing an immediate 100% startup crash for all worker instances.
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* **Failure Mode 2: Premature SQS Queue Message Deletion (Silent Data Loss)**
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The agent relocates `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS(sqsQueueUrl, receiptHandle)` to the start of `processQueue` before executing Python synthesis/training scripts or uploading artifacts to S3. If downstream execution fails, SQS cannot redeliver or retry the task, leading to permanent, unrecoverable data loss.
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* **Failure Mode 3: Malformed Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate` Signature (Security Bypass)**
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The agent modifies service update methods by passing 5 arguments to `findOneAndUpdate`, placing the `{ ...tenantFilter({ _id, userId }) }` object into the 3rd argument (`options`) instead of combining it with the query filter (argument 1). Consequently, the query remains unscoped (`{ _id: data._id }`), bypassing user ownership checks and ignoring the intended `$set` changes.
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* **Failure Mode 4: Async Dependency Execution Crash (`recordingId` Uninitialized)**
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The agent groups `UserAudioProfile`, `Salutation`, and `Recording` queries into a concurrent `Promise.all` block. Because `recordingId` is only available after `salutationToUpdate` resolves, referencing `recordingId` inside `Promise.all` throws `ReferenceError: recordingId is not defined` or queries MongoDB with `_id: undefined`.
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* **Failure Mode 5: Orphaned Job States on Authorization Rejection**
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The agent uses a boolean flag (e.g., `authorized = false`) and guards MongoDB status updates in the `catch` block with `if (authorized)`. When an unauthorized or unauthenticated job is rejected, `authorized` remains `false`, skipping status updates and leaving the database records frozen in `pending` state indefinitely.
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---
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### Grading Dimensions
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#### Narrow Correctness
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- **PASS**: The worker handlers run cleanly without runtime exceptions, syntax errors, or unhandled promise rejections.
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- **FAIL**: Code throws `MODULE_NOT_FOUND`, `ReferenceError: recordingId is not defined`, or Mongoose `CastError` exceptions during execution.
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#### Broader Correctness
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- **PASS**: All primary and secondary MongoDB queries and updates enforce `userId` scoping, preventing cross-tenant access. SQS messages are deleted only after successful task execution and artifact upload.
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- **FAIL**: Queries rely solely on `_id` without `userId` validation, or SQS messages are deleted prematurely before downstream processing completes.
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#### Common Sense
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- **PASS**: Asynchronous dependency execution follows proper chronological order (fetching parent documents before dependent child IDs).
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- **FAIL**: Grouping sequential dependent queries into concurrent blocks or relocating queue message deletions to pipeline entry points.
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#### Verification & Thoroughness
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- **PASS**: The worker pipeline behavior and database error transitions are verified against expected queue message schemas.
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- **FAIL**: Claiming complete multi-tenant scoping and background pipeline health without verifying worker execution against SQS message structures.
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---
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### Scoring Guide
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* **PASS (1.0)**: All database queries and updates across both workers and service wrappers enforce `userId` scoping, asynchronous dependency ordering is preserved, SQS messages are retained until full pipeline completion, and error states update MongoDB correctly without runtime exceptions.
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* **FAIL (0.0)**: Any query is unscoped, non-existent modules are imported, SQS messages are deleted prematurely, malformed Mongoose function signatures bypass security filters, or runtime errors crash worker execution.
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