after build-workspace

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot/harbor-tasks/mishandle_pro_v2/.toolkit-managed.json

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "stampedAt": "2026-09-07T17:37:17.141Z",
+  "stampedAt": "2026-09-17T10:18:49.606Z",
   "files": {
     "tests/test.sh": "34ea5925a7ded396d2d811041236cb9ad655dde08775d0062ba9e8f9ab553600",
-    "tests/grader-system-prompt-consolidated.md": "032ce032728a8c0b2717478b929dbd7535e07c96ffe2e991097dd2c233543275"
+    "tests/grader-system-prompt-consolidated.md": "032ce032728a8c0b2717478b929dbd7535e07c96ffe2e991097dd2c233543275",
+    "environment/Dockerfile": "398f221a5c53742db98053831e1f2e793c321bda2f70aed9519b03d586fa107a"
   }
 }

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot/harbor-tasks/mishandle_pro_v2/environment/browser-optin

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+0

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot/harbor-tasks/mishandle_pro_v2/environment/dns-jail/dns-jail-container.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Restrict this container's DNS to the hosts in DNSJAIL_ALLOW (space-separated), leaving
+# every other name unresolvable. Runs as root, inside the container.
+#
+# Baked into the task images and invoked by the agent (scripts/dnsjail.py); shipped to the
+# Explore container by the toolkit packaging. Both surfaces run this same file. Supplied from
+# outside: DNSJAIL_ALLOW, the hosts the agent will actually dial -- every one must resolve or
+# no jail happens -- and DNSJAIL_ALLOW_EXTRA, nice-to-haves that only warn if they do not.
+#
+# An unreachable model endpoint is a dead trial or a dead session, so nothing here is
+# applied before it is verified, and any doubt leaves the container's DNS untouched.
+set -u
+
+STATE=/tmp/.dnsjail
+CONTROL=example.com   # must NOT resolve through us; proves we reached our own filter
+
+bounded() { if command -v timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then timeout 5 "$@"; else "$@"; fi; }
+# Exact match: docker's own embedded resolver is 127.0.0.11, which a prefix match reads as
+# already-jailed — and then resolv.orig is never captured, so unjail has nothing to restore.
+jailed_now() { grep -qE '^nameserver[[:space:]]+127\.0\.0\.1[[:space:]]*$' /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null; }
+
+# Stop only the dnsmasq we started, so a declined run leaves nothing bound on :53 that a
+# later run could mistake for its own filter.
+drop_ours() {
+  if [ -s "$STATE/dnsmasq.pid" ]; then
+    pid=$(cat "$STATE/dnsmasq.pid")
+    # /tmp survives docker stop/start but pids restart at 1, so last boot's pid may now be
+    # some service's child. Confirm it is dnsmasq before signalling it.
+    case "$(cat "/proc/$pid/comm" 2>/dev/null)" in
+      dnsmasq) kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true ;;
+    esac
+    rm -f "$STATE/dnsmasq.pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+  fi
+}
+
+# Never `exit`: a caller may source this, so bailing out has to fall through rather than
+# end the caller's shell.
+dnsjail_apply() {
+  required="${DNSJAIL_ALLOW:-}"
+  extra="${DNSJAIL_ALLOW_EXTRA:-}"
+  allow=$(echo $required $extra)   # unquoted: collapses to a single-spaced word list
+  # A blank required list means no model endpoint was found: jailing would strand the agent.
+  set -- $required
+  [ $# -gt 0 ] || return 0
+
+  # Already jailed by us, with our resolver alive and the same allowlist? Do nothing. Tearing
+  # down and rebinding :53 races the kernel releasing the socket, and losing that race ends
+  # in a fail-open restore -- so a second apply (the codex fresh path, rejail, run-app) would
+  # silently UNjail a working container.
+  if jailed_now && [ -s "$STATE/dnsmasq.pid" ] &&
+     [ "$(cat "/proc/$(cat "$STATE/dnsmasq.pid")/comm" 2>/dev/null)" = "dnsmasq" ] &&
+     [ "$(cat "$STATE/allow" 2>/dev/null)" = "$required" ] &&
+     [ "$(cat "$STATE/allow-extra" 2>/dev/null)" = "$extra" ]; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  # The state dir has to work first: it holds what unjail restores, and a failed write here
+  # is what would otherwise truncate /etc/resolv.conf. Sticky world-writable so run-app,
+  # running as the container user in Explore, can drop its own lift markers.
+  mkdir -p "$STATE" 2>/dev/null || return 0
+  chmod 1777 "$STATE" 2>/dev/null || true
+  : > "$STATE/.probe" 2>/dev/null || return 0
+  rm -f "$STATE/.probe" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+  # Never forward to ourselves. Re-applying to an already-jailed container would otherwise
+  # read 127.0.0.1 out of resolv.conf and point dnsmasq at its own socket, blackholing
+  # every name.
+  src=/etc/resolv.conf
+  if jailed_now && [ -s "$STATE/resolv.orig" ]; then src="$STATE/resolv.orig"; fi
+  up=$(awk '/^nameserver[ \t]+[0-9]+\./{print $2; exit}' "$src" 2>/dev/null)
+  [ "$up" = "127.0.0.1" ] && up=""
+
+  if [ -n "$up" ] && command -v dnsmasq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    srv=""
+    for h in $allow; do srv="$srv --server=/$h/$up"; done
+    drop_ours
+    # cache-size=0: every lookup goes upstream, so a jailed container sees what an unjailed
+    # one would rather than an answer this resolver decided to keep.
+    dnsmasq --no-resolv --no-hosts --listen-address=127.0.0.1 --bind-interfaces \
+            --cache-size=0 --pid-file="$STATE/dnsmasq.pid" --address=/#/ $srv \
+            >/dev/null 2>>"$STATE/dnsmasq.err" || true
+  fi
+
+  # Ask the resolver directly: the model endpoint must answer and the control must not --
+  # otherwise we are looking at somebody else's resolver, not our filter. Only the FIRST
+  # host gates the jail: an extra host that CNAMEs outside the allowlist cannot resolve
+  # through the catch-all, and one of those must not silently disable the whole jail.
+  live=1
+  for h in $required; do
+    bounded nslookup "$h" 127.0.0.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || { live=""; break; }
+  done
+  if [ -n "$live" ] && bounded nslookup "$CONTROL" 127.0.0.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then live=""; fi
+  # The extras are reported, never fatal: one that CNAMEs outside the allowlist cannot
+  # resolve through the catch-all, and must not take the whole jail down with it.
+  if [ -n "$live" ]; then
+    for h in $extra; do
+      bounded nslookup "$h" 127.0.0.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+        echo "dns-jail: $h does not resolve through the jail (CNAME outside the allowlist?)" >&2
+    done
+  fi
+
+  if [ -z "$live" ]; then
+    # Say why. A silent decline is indistinguishable from a jail that worked, and the
+    # reason is usually one line from dnsmasq (gVisor sandboxes, for instance, have no
+    # AF_NETLINK, so dnsmasq cannot start there at all).
+    echo "dns-jail: declined, this container keeps normal network access${DNSJAIL_WHY:-}" >&2
+    [ -s "$STATE/dnsmasq.err" ] && sed 's/^/dns-jail:   /' "$STATE/dnsmasq.err" >&2
+    drop_ours
+    # Failing open has to mean actually open, including when an earlier run left this
+    # container jailed.
+    if jailed_now && [ -s "$STATE/resolv.orig" ]; then
+      cat "$STATE/resolv.orig" > /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  # Capture what unjail restores — but never overwrite it with an already-jailed file, which
+  # would leave unjail a permanent no-op.
+  if ! jailed_now; then
+    cp /etc/resolv.conf "$STATE/resolv.orig" 2>/dev/null || return 0
+  fi
+  printf '%s\n' "$required" > "$STATE/allow" 2>/dev/null || true
+  printf '%s\n' "$extra" > "$STATE/allow-extra" 2>/dev/null || true
+  # A marker from a run-app that was killed would otherwise keep the jail disarmed forever.
+  rm -rf "$STATE/lifts" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+  # /etc/resolv.conf is a bind mount, so it is truncated in place, never renamed over —
+  # which means the replacement has to be complete BEFORE the write starts. Keep every
+  # non-nameserver directive docker set (options, search).
+  { printf 'nameserver 127.0.0.1\n'
+    grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*nameserver' /etc/resolv.conf
+  } > "$STATE/resolv.jailed" 2>/dev/null
+  [ -s "$STATE/resolv.jailed" ] || return 0
+  cat "$STATE/resolv.jailed" > /etc/resolv.conf
+}
+
+dnsjail_apply || true