detectors again

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-answer-obviousness.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:51:00.281Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-answer-obviousness.md

@@ -10,48 +10,40 @@ Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
 ## What the prompt asks
 
-The prompt suspects the workers may lack tenant isolation and asks to “Audit all db queries across both worker handlers and make them enforce strict multi-tenant authorization so users cannot access or modify records belonging to other tenants.” A thoughtful colleague would inspect both workers and the service methods they call, then make ownership-scoped reads and writes. The prompt does not request a general SQS lifecycle repair or prescribe a source for `recordingId`.
+The user suspects that both workers load and update MongoDB records by document ID alone and asks: “Audit all db queries across both worker handlers and make them enforce strict multi-tenant authorization so users cannot access or modify records belonging to other tenants.” A thoughtful engineer would scope the worker reads and writes, including service methods the workers use, to a trustworthy job owner and check the affected paths. The prompt does not ask to repair all pre-existing queue delivery behavior.
 
 ## Per-expectation assessment
 
-### Tenant-scoped reads and writes — obvious
+### Ownership-scoped model access — obvious
 
-- **What the rubric requires:** “All primary and secondary MongoDB queries and updates enforce `userId` scoping, preventing cross-tenant access.”
+- **What the rubric requires:** “All document lookups, updates, and deletes by ID across primary and secondary models (`UserAudioProfile`, `VoiceCloning`, `Salutation`, `Recording`) must enforce `userId` scoping.”
-- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Yes. Tenant ownership for queries in both handlers is the express task. Fixing wrapper methods those handlers rely on is an ordinary way to make the request effective.
+- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Yes. This is the explicit security request. A solution that leaves an ID-based worker lookup able to reach another user's record misses it.
 - **Verdict for this expectation:** `obvious`.
 
-### Safe update signatures and runnable worker code — obvious
+### Correct Mongoose filter placement and runnable code — obvious
 
-- **What the rubric requires:** “The worker handlers run cleanly without runtime exceptions, syntax errors, or unhandled promise rejections” and “Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate` accepts 3 arguments: `findOneAndUpdate(conditions, update, options)`.”
+- **What the rubric requires:** “Scoping filters must be placed in argument 1 (`conditions`), not in argument 3 (`options`)” and “Fails if the refactored worker fails to boot”.
-- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Yes as an implementation duty: a tenant filter must be placed in the query argument, and new code must run. The exact imagined five-argument mistake is an illustrative failure, not a required implementation shape.
+- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Yes as implementation correctness. A fix must actually constrain the query and keep the workers runnable. The hypothetical five-argument mistake is a failure example, not a mandated implementation design.
 - **Verdict for this expectation:** `obvious`.
 
-### Exact `recordingId` derivation — not-obvious
+### Either owner-safe recording lookup path — obvious
 
-- **What the rubric requires:** “`recordingId` must be extracted from `salutationToUpdate.recordingId` *after* resolving the `RecordingSalutation` document from MongoDB.”
+- **What the rubric requires:** “`recordingId` may be destructured directly from the job payload (`job.recordingId`) or resolved via the resolved salutation record (`salutationToUpdate.recordingId`) when available. Both lookup paths are valid provided user ownership is preserved.”
-- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** No. This is overstated universality: the prompt asks for owner-scoped access, not a specific lookup chain. An agent could reasonably retain a supplied recording ID and verify both it and its relation to the salutation under the same user. The rubric's claim about the available payload is a separate fact-check issue.
+- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Yes. The rubric now credits either data path if it enforces the requested ownership boundary.
+- **Verdict for this expectation:** `obvious`.
+
+### Queue deletion after all work — not-obvious
+
+- **What the rubric requires:** “SQS messages must remain in the queue during task execution and should only be deleted (`deleteMessageFromSQS`) after job execution and artifact storage succeed”.
+- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** No. This is unrequested scope. Both checked-in handlers already delete before processing; an engineer could competently implement the requested tenant isolation while preserving that pre-existing behavior. The rubric grades this unrelated repair as a core requirement.
 - **Verdict for this expectation:** `not-obvious`.
 
-### Completion before SQS deletion — not-obvious
+### Error-state recovery on rejection — obvious in direction
 
-- **What the rubric requires:** “SQS messages are deleted only after successful task execution and artifact upload.”
+- **What the rubric requires:** “status updates (e.g., setting status to `'error'`) must be written safely to the authenticated user's own job record (`{ _id, userId }`).”
-- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** No. This is unrequested scope: queue deletion already occurs early in the checked-in handlers, and a focused tenant-isolation change can leave that existing behavior untouched. The rubric's “FAIL (0.0)” for any premature deletion could reject such a competent, scoped solution.
+- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Rejecting a mismatched record without mutating the foreign tenant's record is obvious. A status update to a separately identified owned job can be reasonable; whether that record is always available is a source-fact and clarity question. The ownership condition itself follows the prompt.
-- **Verdict for this expectation:** `not-obvious`.
-
-### Error-state updates on authorization rejection — not-obvious
-
-- **What the rubric requires:** “On error or authorization rejection, the worker must update MongoDB job/profile statuses to `'error'` regardless of pre-authorization state flags.”
-- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Partly, but the exact unconditional requirement is overstated. A worker should handle rejection coherently; it should not mutate a foreign tenant's record solely to mark it `error`. A scoped status write that matches no foreign record is a defensible response to an unauthorized payload.
-- **Verdict for this expectation:** `not-obvious`.
-
-### Verify queue-schema assumptions — obvious
-
-- **What the rubric requires:** “The worker pipeline behavior and database error transitions are verified against expected queue message schemas.”
-- **Is it obvious from the prompt?** Yes in direction: the fix depends on where the job's user ID comes from, so inspecting actual worker inputs and exercising affected paths is ordinary diligence. The absence of a producer or sample message may limit what can be proven; that is handled by fact-check and offline-verifiability.
 - **Verdict for this expectation:** `obvious`.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The central tenant-isolation request is clear and fairly cued. The rubric also requires a specific recording-ID route, a queue-lifecycle repair, and an unconditional error-state policy that the prompt does not establish as the only acceptable choices. These secondary requirements would mark down plausible focused implementations.
+The central authorization behavior and flexible lookup choice are fairly cued. The queue-lifecycle requirement remains outside the requested security audit, and a focused implementation that leaves the existing deletion timing untouched could be scored down. That secondary gap yields `partial`; the task still has a substantial fair ownership-scoping test. There are no reference runs to cross-check how the rubric applies to actual solutions.
-
-The verdict is `partial`, rather than `not-obvious`, because a real and substantial fair test remains: whether the agent scopes the relevant database operations to the job's user. No reference runs exist to cross-check the alternative paths.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-broken-dev-env.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-broken-dev-env.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ verdict: not-applicable
 confidence: MEDIUM
 ---
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md and current instruction.md.
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
 # Broken-dev-env check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md and
 
 > Audit all db queries across both worker handlers and make them enforce strict multi-tenant authorization so users cannot access or modify records belonging to other tenants.
 
-`reference-runs/` is empty. The rubric discusses possible runtime mistakes in agent changes, but contains no observation that the shipped environment failed to build, install, or run.
+`reference-runs/` is empty. The rubric's “Missing Utility Module Startup Crash” is a possible defect in an agent's change, not evidence of baseline environment failure.
 
 ## Rationale
 
-The no-evidence trigger applies. The prompt is a substantive code-change request, yet there is no trial trajectory showing installation trouble, pre-existing unrelated test failure, or an agent workaround. The package also has no scored runs whose prompt, grade, or output could be checked for corruption or revision drift.
+The no-evidence trigger applies. There is no trial trajectory showing dependency installation trouble, unrelated test failure, or an agent workaround, and no scored run to check for infrastructure corruption or artifact drift. The prompt's stated tenant-isolation concern is consistent with unscoped queries in the shipped workers. Re-run when reference runs supply an environment signal.
-
-The rubric's hypothetical `MODULE_NOT_FOUND` and other crashes are intended agent-introduced defects, not evidence of incidental baseline breakage. Re-run once reference runs provide an environment signal. No prompt premise mismatch is established by the current prompt and workspace inspection.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-credential-leakage.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-credential-leakage.md

@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ verdict: clean
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Credential-leakage check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: instruction.md, task.toml, tests/holistic-rubric.md, and environment/workspace.patch presence.
+# Credential-leakage check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Findings
 
-No `environment/workspace.patch` exists. The strongest near-miss is the `task.toml` placeholder assignment `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY = "${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}"`; it refers to an environment variable and contains no key value. The checked authored surfaces show no secret-shaped added lines or personal checkout path.
+No `environment/workspace.patch` exists. The strongest near-miss is the `task.toml` placeholder `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY = "${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}"`; it refers to an environment variable and contains no key value. The current prompt and rubric contain no secret-shaped value or personal checkout path.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-No credential or internal checkout path is shipped in the authored task surfaces currently present. Re-run if a workspace patch is added.
+No credential or internal checkout path is shipped in the authored task surfaces present. Re-run if a workspace patch is added.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-cross-task-reference.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-cross-task-reference.md

@@ -4,16 +4,16 @@ verdict: clean
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Cross-task-reference check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md and instruction.md.
+# Cross-task-reference check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Verbatim grounding
 
-> The goal is to audit and refactor background SQS worker handlers (`voice-synthsizer-job-handler` and `voice-cloning-job-handler`) and database service wrappers in `potion-voice`
+> The goal of this task is to audit and refactor the backend background worker job handlers (`voice-synthsizer-job-handler` and `voice-cloning-job-handler`) and their underlying service wrappers
 
-This names the source repository and its worker folders. It does not point to a separate graded task.
+This points to the source repository's worker and service files, not to a separate graded task.
 
 ## Rationale
 
-The current tenant-isolation prompt and rubric contain no comparison to, title of, or unresolved pointer into another task. The rubric has other problems, but cross-task dependence is not one of them.
+The current rubric and instruction contain no sibling-task title, comparison, or unresolved external task reference. The task can be read on its own terms; its other scoring issues are covered by other detectors.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-dimension-misapplication.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-dimension-misapplication.md

@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
 ---
 detector: detector-dimension-misapplication
-verdict: clean
+verdict: clear-misapplication
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Dimension-misapplication check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md.
+# Dimension-misapplication check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Verbatim grounding
 
-> #### Narrow Correctness
+> * **Narrow Correctness**: Fails if the refactored worker fails to boot, throws `MODULE_NOT_FOUND`, or triggers unhandled exceptions at runtime.
-> - **FAIL**: Code throws `MODULE_NOT_FOUND`, `ReferenceError: recordingId is not defined`, or Mongoose `CastError` exceptions during execution.
 
-> #### Broader Correctness
+> * **Broader Correctness**: Fails if database queries remain unscoped by `userId`, allowing cross-tenant data access or unauthorized modifications.
-> - **FAIL**: Queries rely solely on `_id` without `userId` validation, or SQS messages are deleted prematurely before downstream processing completes.
 
-> #### Verification & Thoroughness
+> * **Best Practices**: Fails if message queue lifecycle mechanics are violated (premature message deletion) or error state recovery is bypassed.
-> - **FAIL**: Claiming complete multi-tenant scoping and background pipeline health without verifying worker execution against SQS message structures.
+
+The Grading Standard has eight named criteria, including Narrow Correctness, Broader Correctness / craft, and Common Sense. It has no “Best Practices” criterion. The detector's routing rule for non-canonical names states: “The rubric grades axes that aren't among the eight criteria — a made-up ‘Security’ or ‘Code Quality’ axis ... At least `partial-misapplication`; `clear-misapplication` when the non-canonical axis is load-bearing.”
 
 ## Rationale
 
-The rubric places execution failures under Narrow Correctness, security and durability under Broader Correctness, and an unsupported verification claim under Verification & Thoroughness. The Common Sense examples concern poor engineering judgment in ordering dependent operations and moving deletion to pipeline entry. These are plausible criterion bindings under the shared standard. No reference-run grades exist to expose score drift. The rubric's missing criteria and binary score guide are separate rubric-form concerns, not a demonstrated dimension misapplication.
+“Best Practices” is a load-bearing fail axis in the rubric's evaluation section. A grader cannot score that axis on the fixed eight-criterion form without inventing a mapping. Queue durability and error-state recovery are correctness and reliability properties, naturally assessed under Broader Correctness; a resulting runtime failure can also affect Narrow Correctness. Name the appropriate existing criterion instead.
+
+The Narrow Correctness and Broader Correctness bullets themselves route execution and security defects plausibly. No reference-run grades exist to audit for grade drift. The verdict is `clear-misapplication` because the invented axis controls an explicit failure condition.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-fact-check-rubric-claims.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-fact-check-rubric-claims.md

@@ -1,62 +1,56 @@
 ---
 detector: detector-fact-check-rubric-claims
-verdict: fail
+verdict: partial
 confidence: MEDIUM
 claims:
   - id: c01
     verdict: unclear
     loadBearing: true
-    summary: "Voice synthesis SQS payload omits recordingId"
+    summary: "The workers have an authenticated user ID to scope every query"
-    rubricQuote: "SQS messages for voice synthesis contain `job.salutationId`, `job.userAudioProfileId`, and `job.userId`, but do **not** convey `job.recordingId`."
+    rubricQuote: "The refactor must enforce strict multi-tenant data isolation by scoping all database queries with the authenticated user's `userId`"
-    sourceEvidence: "            recordingId,"
+    sourceEvidence: "        const job = JSON.parse(response.Messages[0].Body)"
-    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/index.js (lines 74-82)"
+    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/index.js (lines 68-82); voice-cloning-job-handler/index.js (lines 100-107)"
-    note: "Source unavailable for the actual producer or a sample queue payload: the checked-in consumer explicitly reads recordingId from job at line 79. A repo-wide search found no producer that establishes the rubric's asserted omission; this central payload claim cannot be confirmed from the shipped workspace."
+    note: "unreachable: the prompt describes the job's userId, but the shipped workers parse SQS messages and no authenticated-user context or producer contract was found in the workspace. The identity provenance asserted by the rubric cannot be established from these materials."
   - id: c02
     verdict: pass
     loadBearing: true
-    summary: "RecordingSalutation schema has recordingId link"
+    summary: "Both recording ID lookup paths exist as possibilities"
-    rubricQuote: "`RecordingSalutation` records link a `salutationId` to a parent `recordingId`."
+    rubricQuote: "The identifier `recordingId` may be destructured directly from the job payload (`job.recordingId`) or resolved via the resolved salutation record (`salutationToUpdate.recordingId`) when available."
-    sourceEvidence: "    recordingId: {"
+    sourceEvidence: "            recordingId,"
-    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/recording_salutation/recording_salutation_model.js (lines 16-19)"
+    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/index.js (lines 74-82); voice-synthsizer-job-handler/recording_salutation/recording_salutation_model.js (lines 16-19)"
-    note: "The schema has a recordingId ObjectId reference. The worker uses the salutationId as the _id of this record, which makes the lookup path discoverable from index.js lines 152-155."
+    note: "The worker destructures recordingId from the job and the salutation model has an optional recordingId field. The rubric now correctly qualifies the salutation path with “when available”; both paths are discoverable from the workspace."
   - id: c03
-    verdict: fail
+    verdict: pass
     loadBearing: true
-    summary: "recordingId must always come from resolved salutation"
+    summary: "Mongoose filter belongs in conditions argument"
-    rubricQuote: "`recordingId` must be extracted from `salutationToUpdate.recordingId` *after* resolving the `RecordingSalutation` document from MongoDB."
+    rubricQuote: "Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate(conditions, update, options)` expects the query filter in the first argument (`conditions`)."
-    sourceEvidence: "      required: false"
+    sourceEvidence: "    const updatedJob = await Job.findOneAndUpdate({ _id: job._id }, job, {"
-    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/recording_salutation/recording_salutation_model.js (lines 16-19); voice-synthsizer-job-handler/index.js (lines 74-82, 152-160)"
+    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/job/job_service.js (lines 66-70)"
-    note: "The asserted source field is optional in the schema, while the current consumer expects recordingId in the queue job. The rubric states a mandatory extraction path that the shipped schema cannot guarantee. The agent can discover the optional field and consumer read in these workspace files."
+    note: "The checked-in service uses the documented three-position call shape. A tenant filter in options would not constrain the first-argument query; this is reachable from ordinary Mongoose API knowledge and the local call sites."
   - id: c04
     verdict: pass
     loadBearing: true
-    summary: "SQS deletion currently precedes downstream work"
+    summary: "Both handlers currently delete before downstream processing"
-    rubricQuote: "Deleting messages via `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS` before task completion prevents SQS redelivery on failure, causing unrecoverable data loss."
+    rubricQuote: "SQS messages must remain in the queue during task execution and should only be deleted (`deleteMessageFromSQS`) after job execution and artifact storage succeed"
     sourceEvidence: "          await sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS(sqsQueueUrl, receiptHandle)"
     sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/index.js (lines 71-72, 113-139); voice-cloning-job-handler/index.js (lines 129-130, 174-276)"
-    note: "Both handlers call delete before their Python work and uploads. The redelivery implication follows SQS delete semantics; the order is directly reachable from the worker code."
+    note: "Both workers delete before their Python processing and uploads, making this a real existing reliability defect. The call order is directly visible in the workspace; the rubric's choice to require a repair is a separate scope question."
   - id: c05
-    verdict: partial
+    verdict: fail
-    loadBearing: true
+    loadBearing: false
-    summary: "Malformed Mongoose call ignores ownership filters"
+    summary: "Malformed signature necessarily ignores update payload"
-    rubricQuote: "Passing 5 arguments or placing query filters in the `options` argument bypasses user scoping and causes updates to be ignored."
+    rubricQuote: "Bypasses `userId` ownership checks and ignores update payload parameters."
     sourceEvidence: "    const updatedJob = await Job.findOneAndUpdate({ _id: job._id }, job, {"
     sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-synthsizer-job-handler/job/job_service.js (lines 66-70)"
-    note: "The workspace demonstrates the standard conditions/update/options arrangement. Putting tenant conditions into options would leave the first-argument query unscoped, but this does not by itself imply that the second-argument update is ignored. No five-argument example or local Mongoose API implementation ships for direct confirmation."
+    note: "Putting an ownership filter in argument 3 leaves the query in argument 1 unscoped, but it does not by itself ignore the update in argument 2. Extra fourth and fifth arguments do not establish that the second argument is ignored. The security-bypass claim remains valid; the added update-payload consequence is false as a general statement."
-  - id: c06
-    verdict: pass
-    loadBearing: true
-    summary: "Cloning catch writes error statuses"
-    rubricQuote: "On error or authorization rejection, the worker must update MongoDB job/profile statuses to `'error'` regardless of pre-authorization state flags."
-    sourceEvidence: "          await voiceCloningService.update({ _id, status: 'error' })"
-    sourceProvenance: "harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/voice-cloning-job-handler/index.js (lines 278-292)"
-    note: "The current cloning catch writes error status to cloning and profile records without an authorization flag, supporting the intended recovery pattern. This is a proposed behavior for future authorization rejection, not evidence that such a rejection path currently exists."
 ---
 
-# Fact-check rubric claims: potion-voice-user-ownership
-
 Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
+# Fact-check rubric claims: potion-voice-user-ownership
+
 Source: `harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/environment/workspace/` — built from `repos/potion-voice` at commit `fcd8a9d` (resolved locally). No `environment/workspace.patch` exists.
 
-Checked 6 claims (all load-bearing; one fail, one partial, one unclear). The central claim that `salutationToUpdate.recordingId` is mandatory fails because the schema marks that field optional. The exact SQS producer payload is unavailable in this repository; the consumer explicitly destructures `recordingId` from `job`.
+Checked 5 claims (four load-bearing; one non-load-bearing claim failed, one load-bearing claim is unclear and unreachable). The current rubric qualifies the salutation-recording lookup with “when available,” matching the optional schema field.
+
+Unreachable: c01 (authenticated-user provenance for worker job messages). Put a trustworthy identity contract in the task materials, or stop gating the score on knowledge of an authentication context the workspace does not provide.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-good-response-defined.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-good-response-defined.md

@@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ verdict: defines-good
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Good-response-defined check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md.
+# Good-response-defined check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Positive target present?
 
-The rubric explicitly states: “All primary and secondary MongoDB queries and updates enforce `userId` scoping, preventing cross-tenant access. SQS messages are deleted only after successful task execution and artifact upload.” Its scoring guide also describes preserving dependency order, error transitions, and execution without runtime exceptions.
+The rubric says: “All document lookups, updates, and deletes by ID across primary and secondary models (`UserAudioProfile`, `VoiceCloning`, `Salutation`, `Recording`) must enforce `userId` scoping.” It also states where tenant filters go in Mongoose calls, credits either owner-safe recording-ID path, describes queue timing, and requires owner-scoped error-status writes. These are affirmative implementation targets, not merely a list of failure examples.
 
 ## What the grader has to infer
 
-The grader would need to reconcile those targets with several questionable ground-truth claims and the narrower tenant-isolation request in the current prompt. The positive target itself is present; the rubric is not a problems-only catalog.
+The Key AI Failure Modes list is negative, and the short evaluation bullets mostly say “Fails if.” The grader still has the Core Technical Requirements as a concrete positive target. Whether the queue requirement belongs in this task, and how to map “Best Practices” to the standard, are separate scope and dimension issues.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-A concrete implementation success target is defined for the load-bearing work. This verdict does not certify that the target is fairly requested or technically correct.
+A grader can recognize the intended strong security refactor from the requirements section. The rubric defines good despite its remaining scoring and factual issues.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-good-response-exhaustiveness.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-good-response-exhaustiveness.md

@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
 ## Plausible strong-response approaches
 
-The prompt calls for an implementation: audit both worker handlers and enforce ownership on their MongoDB access. A broad majority of engineers would accept a focused solution that scopes each read and update, rejects mismatched records, and reports what was checked. A deeper refactor that also corrects SQS acknowledgment timing could also be sound, but the prompt does not require that extra repair. If the message lacks a trustworthy user ID in a particular path, flagging that prerequisite and safely refusing the operation is another legitimate part of the implementation.
+The prompt asks for tenant-isolation work in two workers. A focused implementation can scope all ID-based reads and writes, reject foreign records, preserve unrelated processing behavior, and report its verification. A broader implementation can also change SQS deletion timing. Either can satisfy the stated user request if the authorization boundary is sound. The prompt does not create a build-versus-buy or assessment-versus-fix fork; it asks the agent to act.
 
 ## Coverage in the rubric
 
-The rubric credits full tenant scoping: “All primary and secondary MongoDB queries and updates enforce `userId` scoping.” It does not credit the focused solution if it preserves the existing early SQS deletion: its pass tier also requires “SQS messages are retained until full pipeline completion” and its fail tier says “SQS messages are deleted prematurely.” A solution that validates an existing recording ID under the job's owner, rather than deriving it from the optional salutation field, is likewise excluded by the ground-truth prescription that `recordingId` “must be extracted from `salutationToUpdate.recordingId`.” There are no reference runs to support a run-specific penalty-side finding.
+The rubric now credits both recording lookup paths: “Both lookup paths are valid provided user ownership is preserved.” It credits owner-scoped service operations. But the focused implementation that leaves pre-existing early queue deletion unchanged is excluded by “SQS messages must remain in the queue during task execution and should only be deleted (`deleteMessageFromSQS`) after job execution and artifact storage succeed” and “Best Practices: Fails if message queue lifecycle mechanics are violated.” No reference runs exist for a run-specific penalty-side assessment.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The rubric covers the central security fix but excludes a major reasonable approach: implementing the requested ownership controls without changing an unrelated, pre-existing queue acknowledgment policy. Widen the strong tier to credit that focused solution, while still penalizing new queue regressions, and allow owner-validated recording relationships that satisfy the same isolation goal.
+A major reasonable approach to the actual prompt—do the requested tenant-isolation refactor without a separate queue-lifecycle repair—has no strong-response home. The broader refactor is also plausible, but should not be the only passing path unless the prompt asks for it. The revised flexible recording rule resolves the earlier lookup-path coverage gap.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-meaningful-failure.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-meaningful-failure.md

@@ -4,21 +4,23 @@ verdict: not-applicable
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Meaningful-failure check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md and reference-runs/.
+# Meaningful-failure check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Load-bearing targets
 
-- Missing `worker_tenant` utility causing startup failure.
+- A missing imported utility module causes worker startup failure.
-- Deleting SQS messages before synthesis, training, and uploads complete.
+- SQS deletion before downstream work prevents retry after failure.
-- Malformed five-argument `findOneAndUpdate` calls that leave filters unscoped.
+- Misplaced Mongoose filters leave ownership unscoped.
-- Reading `recordingId` before resolving the related salutation.
+- Error-state writes skipped after authorization rejection leave jobs pending or processing.
-- Skipping error-state updates after authorization rejection.
+- Concurrent dependent lookups cause reference errors or unhandled rejections.
+
+These are central weak-response examples in the rubric, not peripheral guardrails.
 
 ## Elicitation matrix
 
-No reference runs exist, so none of the targets has an observable fire count or `grade.md` evidence.
+`reference-runs/` is empty. There are no observed fires or `grade.md` files to form a matrix.
 
 ## Per-deduction assessment
 
@@ -26,8 +28,8 @@ No scored deductions exist to assess.
 
 ## Guidance-wide severity audit
 
-The asserted harms cannot be calibrated against observed responses until reference runs exist. No severity conclusion is made here.
+The rubric's harm claims cannot be calibrated against observed agent behavior until trials exist. This report makes no severity verdict from the rubric's wording alone.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The no-reference-runs trigger applies. Run trials against the current prompt, then re-run this detector to assess whether the stated failures actually occur and whether their consequences are proportionate.
+The no-reference-runs trigger applies. Capture trials against the current prompt and rubric, then re-run this detector to test whether the central failures occur and whether their harms are supported and proportionate.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-offline-verifiability.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-offline-verifiability.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 detector: detector-offline-verifiability
-verdict: partial
+verdict: offline-verifiable
 confidence: MEDIUM
 ---
 
@@ -10,16 +10,12 @@ Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
 ## Findings
 
-### Queue-schema verification — evidence outside shipped repo (partial)
+The strongest near-miss is the queue reliability requirement:
 
-- **Where:** `tests/holistic-rubric.md`, Verification & Thoroughness.
+> SQS messages must remain in the queue during task execution and should only be deleted (`deleteMessageFromSQS`) after job execution and artifact storage succeed, ensuring SQS retry mechanisms function properly on failure.
-- **Quote:**
 
-  > The worker pipeline behavior and database error transitions are verified against expected queue message schemas.
+This is checkable offline as a local call-order and failure-path property using stubs for SQS, MongoDB, and artifact storage. The core user request is also local: a test can assert that Mongoose receives filters containing the job owner's `userId` and refuses mismatched records. The rubric accepts both recording-ID paths and does not require proving a particular unavailable queue payload shape. The manifests already declare the Node dependencies used by these workers.
-
-- **Why it lives outside:** The workspace includes the consumers but no SQS producer, captured queue message, local queue fake, or local MongoDB integration test. Source inspection and isolated model-call tests can check ownership filters and error paths, but cannot establish the claimed actual message schema or end-to-end queue behavior from the shipped material.
-- **Something to consider:** Include a representative local message fixture and faithful queue/database fake, or grade the agent's explicitly bounded local verification of ownership queries.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The tenant-isolation implementation is mostly offline-completable: the Node dependencies and worker source are shipped, and owner-scoped query construction can be checked locally. The rubric's queue-schema verification expectation relies on a payload contract not established by the repository; the worker even destructures `recordingId` from the message while the rubric says it is absent. This is a secondary verifiability gap, so the verdict is `partial`, not a claim that the whole task requires live services.
+A competent engineer can implement and verify the scored ownership and call-order behavior from the shipped source without a live SQS queue, tenant database, or S3 bucket. Such local checks cannot prove production delivery, but the rubric asks for code behavior that a faithful fake can exercise. This is offline-verifiable; the absence of pre-existing tests affects how much verification work the agent must do, not whether the task requires the internet.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-over-hinting.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-over-hinting.md

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
 ## Findings
 
-The closest candidate is the prompt's statement: “job handlers fetch database models using only document IDs supplied in SQS payloads without verifying that they belong to the job's userId.” It identifies the user-visible suspected defect and defines the requested security outcome. It does not reveal the rubric's less-obvious recording relationship, Mongoose signature failure, queue deletion concern, or error-state issue. There is no `environment/workspace.patch` carrying authored comments to inspect.
+The closest candidate is the prompt's statement: “job handlers fetch database models using only document IDs supplied in SQS payloads without verifying that they belong to the job's userId.” It describes the suspected defect and requested security outcome. That is a genuine user requirement, not a hint toward a separately graded discovery: the agent must still find and fix every affected query. The prompt does not name the rubric's Mongoose argument-shape failure, queue-deletion condition, or error-status guard. There is no `environment/workspace.patch` with authored comments to inspect.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The prompt's specificity is a genuine requirement and plausible incident description, not a giveaway of an independent discovery task. The agent still has to find and correct the relevant access paths. No authored workspace hint surface exists.
+The request gives useful problem context without handing over the implementation or the secondary failure modes. No added workspace comments form another hint surface.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-clarity.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-clarity.md

@@ -4,26 +4,26 @@ verdict: material-issues
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Rubric-clarity check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md.
+# Rubric-clarity check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Material ambiguities
 
-### Binary guide conflicts with criterion grading
+### Queue defect: pre-existing condition or new regression
 
-- **Where:** Scoring Guide: “PASS (1.0)” for every property together and “FAIL (0.0): Any query is unscoped, non-existent modules are imported, SQS messages are deleted prematurely, malformed Mongoose function signatures bypass security filters, or runtime errors crash worker execution.”
+- **Where:** “SQS messages must remain in the queue during task execution and should only be deleted (`deleteMessageFromSQS`) after job execution and artifact storage succeed” versus “**Defect**: Moving `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS(...)` to the beginning of the job handler”.
-- **Why it's ambiguous:** One grader could assign 0.0 overall for a single remaining unscoped query; another could score the eight standard criteria independently and penalize the affected correctness dimensions. These produce materially different scores. The guide does not say whether its binary numbers override the standard.
+- **Why it's ambiguous:** The checked-in workers already delete at the beginning. One grader could fail an agent that leaves that behavior intact; another could treat only a newly moved deletion as the named failure. The difference materially changes the score for a focused tenant-isolation fix.
 
-### Scope of every query is underspecified
+### Status write after rejected ownership
 
-- **Where:** Ground Truth: “Primary and secondary model operations (`UserAudioProfile`, `VoiceCloning`, `Salutation`, `Job`, `Recording`) must be scoped with `{ _id, userId, deleted: false }`.”
+- **Where:** “When a job fails due to execution errors or authorization rejection, status updates (e.g., setting status to `'error'`) must be written safely to the authenticated user's own job record (`{ _id, userId }`).” and “Jobs must not be left frozen in a `'pending'` or `'processing'` state upon failure or rejection.”
-- **Why it's ambiguous:** The requirement could include inserts, list queries, status updates, and operations that do not have an `_id` input; or only lookups and updates by ID. The grading consequence of a missed service wrapper depends on which reading is used.
+- **Why it's ambiguous:** The rubric does not identify which owned record can be updated when an SQS ID points to a foreign tenant's document or when no owned job record is available. A grader could require a status change that a safe owner-scoped query cannot make, or accept a rejected message with no foreign record mutation.
 
-### Error transition on rejected ownership
+### Non-standard evaluation axis
 
-- **Where:** Ground Truth: “On error or authorization rejection, the worker must update MongoDB job/profile statuses to `'error'` regardless of pre-authorization state flags.”
+- **Where:** “**Best Practices**: Fails if message queue lifecycle mechanics are violated (premature message deletion) or error state recovery is bypassed.”
-- **Why it's ambiguous:** It does not say which tenant's records can be changed when the ID belongs to another user. A grader could require a status write even on a foreign record, conflicting with the ownership rule, or only a scoped write that may match nothing.
+- **Why it's ambiguous:** The shared grading form has no Best Practices score. A grader might fold this into Broader Correctness, Common Sense, or an invented ninth axis. The dimension-misapplication report treats the invented axis as the primary defect; here it also makes application of the fail condition ambiguous.
 
 ## Copy-edit issues
 
@@ -31,4 +31,4 @@ None found that materially interrupts reading.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The binary scoring guide and authorization-rejection status rule can lead reasonable graders to different outcomes. Clarify those before using the rubric to score trials.
+The queue trigger, rejection-status rule, and non-standard scoring label allow materially different grading decisions. The verdict is driven by those scoring ambiguities, not prose polish.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-coverage.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-coverage.md

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ verdict: not-applicable
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
+
 # Rubric-coverage check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md against absent tests/atomic-rubric.yaml and tests/grader-context.md.
@@ -26,8 +28,8 @@ None can be assessed without atomic criteria.
 
 ## Crux alignment
 
-No atomic crux criteria exist. The holistic rubric also has no explicit heavy-penalty section to map.
+No atomic crux criteria exist. The holistic rubric has no explicit overall-score heavy penalty to map.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The no-atomic-rubric trigger applies. Write the atomic package after finalizing the holistic rubric, then re-run this detector.
+The no-atomic-rubric trigger applies. Finalize the holistic rubric, create the atomic package, then re-run this detector.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-form.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-form.md

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ verdict: not-applicable
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
+
 # Rubric-form check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 Assessed: absent tests/atomic-rubric.yaml.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-generality.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-rubric-generality.md

@@ -4,22 +4,22 @@ verdict: generalizes
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Rubric-generality check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md.
+# Rubric-generality check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Load-bearing run-dependence
 
-None found. The rubric describes possible response properties and failure modes without tying a score to named reference runs.
+None found. The requirements and failure examples are stated as general response properties, without relying on outcomes from particular reference runs.
 
 ## Run-anchored phrasings
 
-None found. “The agent adds import statements” is an illustrative failure mode, not a claim about an observed run.
+None found. “Key AI Failure Modes” introduces hypothetical behavior patterns, not observed-run statistics or run-derived scoring gates.
 
 ## Infra-framework references
 
-None found. SQS and MongoDB are application dependencies, not grading infrastructure.
+None found. SQS, MongoDB, and S3 are application technologies, not names of the grading framework.
 
 ## Overall verdict
 
-The rubric can be applied to a new agent without knowing any particular trial's behavior. This does not resolve its factual or scope issues.
+The rubric can be applied to a new agent without knowing how any reference run behaved. Its invented “Best Practices” axis is a dimension-mapping problem, not run anchoring.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-run-behaviors.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-run-behaviors.md

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ verdict: not-applicable
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
+
 # Run-behaviors check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
-Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/reference-runs/.
+`reference-runs/` is empty. A behavior-by-run matrix needs at least two captured runs. Capture reference runs and re-run this detector.
-
-`reference-runs/` is empty. A behavior-by-run matrix needs at least two captured runs. Run trials and copy their reference runs, then re-run this detector.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-snapshot-leakage.inputs.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T19:50:53.122Z",
+  "capturedAt": "2026-10-09T20:03:08.852Z",
   "capturedBy": "stamp",
   "inputs": {
     "prompt": "75042109a7aab36d9a50fe23f5ac417488f437efb25575a987c4fe35d8103b16",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     "workspacePatch": null,
     "gitref": "fcd8a9d",
     "graderGuidanceConsolidated": null,
-    "holisticRubric": "1741564f653207e011d449854de8aa9d569a8c560c01ad74cff6bda42e6438dc",
+    "holisticRubric": "87449e99a8753063192c16208011911372d67a5c23e7effb2d102de2bfa28afa",
     "atomicRubric": null,
     "rubricsYaml": null,
     "graderContext": null

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/detectors/detector-snapshot-leakage.md

@@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ verdict: not-applicable
 confidence: HIGH
 ---
 
-# Snapshot-leakage check: potion-voice-user-ownership
+Assessed: harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md
 
-Assessed: environment/session.jsonl presence, sidechains, bundled artifacts, and harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md.
+# Snapshot-leakage check: potion-voice-user-ownership
 
 ## Verbatim grounding
 
-`environment/session.jsonl` and `environment/session/` do not exist. `environment/workspace.patch` is also absent. The task is a manual scaffold, with no injected snapshot conversation to compare with the rubric.
+`environment/session.jsonl` and `environment/session/` do not exist. `environment/workspace.patch` is absent. This is a manual task with no injected snapshot conversation or added answer-bearing artifact to compare against the current rubric.
 
 ## Rationale
 
-The no-snapshot trigger applies. The built workspace was also checked for a bundled answer artifact; no added patch or results directory exists. This says nothing about the rubric's fairness as a standalone task.
+The no-snapshot trigger applies. The environment bundle was checked for a session, sidechains, workspace patch, and added results. None exists. A substantive standalone prompt is present, but there is no snapshot leakage surface; no snapshot action is required unless one is later added.
 
 ## Snapshot hygiene (advisory)
 
-No hygiene issues noted. The prompt is substantive; this manual task has no injected snapshot session.
+No hygiene issues noted.

worker-toolkit-potion-polyglot-v1.0.1/harbor-tasks/potion-voice-user-ownership/tests/holistic-rubric.md

@@ -1,65 +1,55 @@
-# Holistic Rubric: Multi-Tenant Authorization in Background Workers
+# Holistic Rubric: Multi-Tenant Data Isolation Audit & Worker Security Refactor
 
-### Task Summary
+## Task Summary
-The goal is to audit and refactor background SQS worker handlers (`voice-synthsizer-job-handler` and `voice-cloning-job-handler`) and database service wrappers in `potion-voice` to enforce strict multi-tenant data isolation by scoping all MongoDB queries with `userId`. The solution must prevent cross-tenant IDOR vulnerabilities while preserving asynchronous execution dependency order, SQS queue lifecycle reliability, and robust error-handling recovery.
+The goal of this task is to audit and refactor the backend background worker job handlers (`voice-synthsizer-job-handler` and `voice-cloning-job-handler`) and their underlying service wrappers (`user_audio_profile_service`, `voice_cloning_service`, `salutation_service`). The refactor must enforce strict multi-tenant data isolation by scoping all database queries with the authenticated user's `userId`, preventing unauthorized cross-tenant record lookups, modifications, and data leaks.
 
 ---
 
-### Ground Truth
+## Core Technical Requirements & Ground Truth
-1. **Queue Message Context**: SQS messages for voice synthesis contain `job.salutationId`, `job.userAudioProfileId`, and `job.userId`, but do **not** convey `job.recordingId`.
+
-2. **Database Relationships**:
+### 1. Multi-Tenant Query Scoping
-   - `RecordingSalutation` records link a `salutationId` to a parent `recordingId`.
+* **Primary and Secondary Models**: All document lookups, updates, and deletes by ID across primary and secondary models (`UserAudioProfile`, `VoiceCloning`, `Salutation`, `Recording`) must enforce `userId` scoping.
-   - `recordingId` must be extracted from `salutationToUpdate.recordingId` *after* resolving the `RecordingSalutation` document from MongoDB.
+* **Filter Conditions**: Database queries using `findOne`, `findById`, `findOneAndUpdate`, or `update` must include user ownership checks (e.g., `{ _id, userId, deleted: false }` or combining query conditions with `userId`).
-3. **Mongoose Query Standards**:
+* **Mongoose API Signature Accuracy**: Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate(conditions, update, options)` expects the query filter in the first argument (`conditions`). Scoping filters must be placed in argument 1 (`conditions`), not in argument 3 (`options`), as placing filters in options leaves argument 1 unscoped and bypasses security validation.
-   - Primary and secondary model operations (`UserAudioProfile`, `VoiceCloning`, `Salutation`, `Job`, `Recording`) must be scoped with `{ _id, userId, deleted: false }`.
+
-   - Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate` accepts 3 arguments: `findOneAndUpdate(conditions, update, options)`. Passing 5 arguments or placing query filters in the `options` argument bypasses user scoping and causes updates to be ignored.
+### 2. Flexible Identification & Lookup Resolution
-4. **Queue & Async Lifecycle**:
+* **Extraction Paths**: The identifier `recordingId` may be destructured directly from the job payload (`job.recordingId`) or resolved via the resolved salutation record (`salutationToUpdate.recordingId`) when available. Both lookup paths are valid provided user ownership is preserved.
-   - SQS messages must remain in flight until speech synthesis, model artifact rendering, and S3 uploads complete successfully.
+
-   - Deleting messages via `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS` before task completion prevents SQS redelivery on failure, causing unrecoverable data loss.
+### 3. SQS Message Queue Reliability
-5. **Error Status Updates**:
+* **Queue Lifecycle**: SQS messages must remain in the queue during task execution and should only be deleted (`deleteMessageFromSQS`) after job execution and artifact storage succeed, ensuring SQS retry mechanisms function properly on failure.
-   - On error or authorization rejection, the worker must update MongoDB job/profile statuses to `'error'` regardless of pre-authorization state flags.
+
+### 4. Error Handling & State Recovery
+* **Error Status Updates**: When a job fails due to execution errors or authorization rejection, status updates (e.g., setting status to `'error'`) must be written safely to the authenticated user's own job record (`{ _id, userId }`).
+* **No Orphaned States**: Jobs must not be left frozen in a `'pending'` or `'processing'` state upon failure or rejection.
 
 ---
 
-### Key AI Failure Modes (Meaningful Failures)
+## Key AI Failure Modes
 
-* **Failure Mode 1: Missing Utility Module Startup Crash (`MODULE_NOT_FOUND`)**
+### Failure Mode 1: Missing Utility Module Startup Crash (`MODULE_NOT_FOUND`)
-  The agent adds import statements like `const { requireUserId, tenantFilter } = require('../worker_tenant')` across worker files without creating `worker_tenant.js` or `worker_tenant/index.js` in the repository. At runtime, Node.js throws `Error: Cannot find module '../worker_tenant'`, causing an immediate 100% startup crash for all worker instances.
+* **Defect**: Adding imports for an uncreated module (e.g., `require('../worker_tenant')`).
+* **Consequence**: Causes an immediate `MODULE_NOT_FOUND` runtime crash on worker startup.
 
-* **Failure Mode 2: Premature SQS Queue Message Deletion (Silent Data Loss)**
+### Failure Mode 2: Premature SQS Message Deletion
-  The agent relocates `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS(sqsQueueUrl, receiptHandle)` to the start of `processQueue` before executing Python synthesis/training scripts or uploading artifacts to S3. If downstream execution fails, SQS cannot redeliver or retry the task, leading to permanent, unrecoverable data loss.
+* **Defect**: Moving `sqs.deleteMessageFromSQS(...)` to the beginning of the job handler before database checks, dataset preparation, or S3 uploads complete.
+* **Consequence**: If downstream processing fails, the message is already deleted from SQS, preventing retries and causing silent data loss.
 
-* **Failure Mode 3: Malformed Mongoose `findOneAndUpdate` Signature (Security Bypass)**
+### Failure Mode 3: Malformed Mongoose Function Signature
-  The agent modifies service update methods by passing 5 arguments to `findOneAndUpdate`, placing the `{ ...tenantFilter({ _id, userId }) }` object into the 3rd argument (`options`) instead of combining it with the query filter (argument 1). Consequently, the query remains unscoped (`{ _id: data._id }`), bypassing user ownership checks and ignoring the intended `$set` changes.
+* **Defect**: Passing 5 arguments to `findOneAndUpdate` or placing tenant filters inside argument 3 (`options`) instead of argument 1 (`conditions`).
+* **Consequence**: Bypasses `userId` ownership checks and ignores update payload parameters.
 
-* **Failure Mode 4: Async Dependency Execution Crash (`recordingId` Uninitialized)**
+### Failure Mode 4: Orphaned Job States on Rejection
-  The agent groups `UserAudioProfile`, `Salutation`, and `Recording` queries into a concurrent `Promise.all` block. Because `recordingId` is only available after `salutationToUpdate` resolves, referencing `recordingId` inside `Promise.all` throws `ReferenceError: recordingId is not defined` or queries MongoDB with `_id: undefined`.
+* **Defect**: Wrapping error status updates in `if (authorized)` guards inside `catch` blocks.
+* **Consequence**: When unauthorized access is rejected, `authorized` remains `false`, skipping status updates and leaving records permanently stuck in a pending state.
 
-* **Failure Mode 5: Orphaned Job States on Authorization Rejection**
+### Failure Mode 5: Unsafe Concurrent Async Execution
-  The agent uses a boolean flag (e.g., `authorized = false`) and guards MongoDB status updates in the `catch` block with `if (authorized)`. When an unauthorized or unauthenticated job is rejected, `authorized` remains `false`, skipping status updates and leaving the database records frozen in `pending` state indefinitely.
+* **Defect**: Grouping dependent sequential database lookups into `Promise.all` before parent references resolve.
+* **Consequence**: Causes unhandled promise rejections or runtime reference errors (`recordingId is not defined`).
 
 ---
 
-### Grading Dimensions
+## Evaluation Dimensions & Scoring Guide
 
-#### Narrow Correctness
+* **Narrow Correctness**: Fails if the refactored worker fails to boot, throws `MODULE_NOT_FOUND`, or triggers unhandled exceptions at runtime.
-- **PASS**: The worker handlers run cleanly without runtime exceptions, syntax errors, or unhandled promise rejections.
+* **Broader Correctness**: Fails if database queries remain unscoped by `userId`, allowing cross-tenant data access or unauthorized modifications.
-- **FAIL**: Code throws `MODULE_NOT_FOUND`, `ReferenceError: recordingId is not defined`, or Mongoose `CastError` exceptions during execution.
+* **Best Practices**: Fails if message queue lifecycle mechanics are violated (premature message deletion) or error state recovery is bypassed.
-
-#### Broader Correctness
-- **PASS**: All primary and secondary MongoDB queries and updates enforce `userId` scoping, preventing cross-tenant access. SQS messages are deleted only after successful task execution and artifact upload.
-- **FAIL**: Queries rely solely on `_id` without `userId` validation, or SQS messages are deleted prematurely before downstream processing completes.
-
-#### Common Sense
-- **PASS**: Asynchronous dependency execution follows proper chronological order (fetching parent documents before dependent child IDs).
-- **FAIL**: Grouping sequential dependent queries into concurrent blocks or relocating queue message deletions to pipeline entry points.
-
-#### Verification & Thoroughness
-- **PASS**: The worker pipeline behavior and database error transitions are verified against expected queue message schemas.
-- **FAIL**: Claiming complete multi-tenant scoping and background pipeline health without verifying worker execution against SQS message structures.
-
----
-
-### Scoring Guide
-* **PASS (1.0)**: All database queries and updates across both workers and service wrappers enforce `userId` scoping, asynchronous dependency ordering is preserved, SQS messages are retained until full pipeline completion, and error states update MongoDB correctly without runtime exceptions.
-* **FAIL (0.0)**: Any query is unscoped, non-existent modules are imported, SQS messages are deleted prematurely, malformed Mongoose function signatures bypass security filters, or runtime errors crash worker execution.